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Many thanks to our commentators—Jake Beck, Nico Orlandi and Aaron Franklin, 
and Ian Phillips—for their stimulating and challenging questions. Our paper was cast as a 
challenge to Ned Block’s empirical arguments for the claim that perceptual 
consciousness “overflows” cognitive access. As a result, in places it slights the 
development of a positive alternative. Moreover, it sometimes clouds matters by offering 
multiple possibilities for development. The commentators press us for more detail. This is 
of course appropriate even if our central point was negative, since a challenge’s force in 
part depends on there being a plausible alternative. They raise other worries as well. We 
won’t do justice to them all, but will try at least to say something useful. There are some 
overlapping themes across their remarks; but rather than weave our replies together, 
which might hinder comparison with the commentaries, we organize them by author, 
taking up questions in the order raised. 
It might be helpful, however, if we first say something about the paper’s general 
strategy. Our aim was to show that current work in perception science provides ways to 
account for participants’ performance in post-cueing tasks without hypothesizing a series 
of stores of declining capacity. These alternatives highlight instead the complexities 
involved in transitions from signal to representations to report—in particular, the various 
ways both encoding and retrieval provide opportunities for omission and error. We 
discussed, for example, how the path dependence of greedy algorithms can provide 
accurate encodings concerning one region at the cost of inaccurate or absent encodings 
elsewhere; and how retrieval in the form of sampling from a probabilistic representation 
can generate inaccurate reports. These explanations look rather different from models that 
posit an information bottleneck owing to stores of declining capacity. Whether, as 
recounted by us, they add up to a fully developed positive alternative depends in part on 
how detailed and complete one requires an alternative to be. But they are intended to 
indicate directions available in current work, the particulars of which will no doubt shift 
as research proceeds. 
Suppose we have at least lessened the strength of Block’s arguments for 
perceptual consciousness overflowing cognitive access. What should one say about 
perceptual consciousness? Though we entered some speculative remarks in our paper, 
here we will only underscore the interest of the particular form the question takes in light 
of the work we discuss: if the posited perceptual representations are probabilistic but the 
content of perceptual consciousness is not (as many, but not all, maintain), how are they 
related? 
 
 
Beck 
Beck raises three worries. First, he notes that the debate among competing 
conceptions of working memory is more open than our paper might suggest. Second, and 
third, he presents two ways we might be viewed as retaining overflow: owing to 
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information lost in the transition from a probabilistic representation to a discrete sampling 
therefrom, or owing to the number of items represented in one set of probabilistic 
representations in comparison to another. Before addressing Beck’s worries, we provide 
one clarification that will also prove relevant in addressing the third worry. 
In outlining our challenge to overflow hypotheses, Beck asks: “how is the visual 
system supposed to construct a representation of the cued row [in Sperling’s post-cue 
paradigm] unless it has stored a representation of the full display,” since “[o]nce the cue 
has arrived, the display is gone”? He notes one possible answer found in our discussion—
that representations of lower-level features are stored, from which (in a manner affected 
by the cue) representations of higher-level features are generated—but notes as well our 
remark that we don’t assume generally this sort of hierarchical representational 
dependence. Beck thus suggests that our more general argument turns on evidence for 
probabilistic representations in perception. 
But this isn’t quite right. Our argument against Block’s use of Lamme and 
colleagues’ results do turn on evidence for probabilistic representations in perception (as 
does one part of our response to Bronfman et al.). But, regarding Sperling, they play a 
role in just one of the various ways we develop our claim that the cue might post-
dictively affect which letters (actually, alpha-numeric characters) get represented. The 
point of our remark concerning hierarchical representational dependencies is that our 
reply to Sperling goes through even for ground-level representations: representations that 
are not themselves dependent on representations of lower-level features. To see this, 
consider any case where the visual system generates ground-level representations from 
transduced signals—on the assumption that transduced signals, though they may in one 
of various senses carry information, are not themselves representational (Block 2014b, 
following Burge 2010, endorses such a position). Still, there might be post-dictive effects 
on the generation of those ground-level representations. The effect of a cue is just more 
signal. If it occurs within the post-dictive window, it can play a role in the generation of 
representations. It may be that this process involves probabilistic representations; but the 
general point doesn’t require that. 
Compare standard examples of post-diction, such as sound-induced visual 
bounce. Yes, the sound occurs after the disks have crossed. But that doesn’t entail that 
first we represent the disks as not bouncing and then we represent the sound, and then we 
generate a conscious representation of the disks bouncing at the time of the sound. That 
could be. But it also could be that the signal produced by the disks and by the sound are 
processed together (even though the former is transduced before the latter) to yield the 
conscious representation, without a prior representation of non-bouncing disks. The point 
to be drawn from post-diction is that perception integrates information over a brief 
temporal window. That point can be naturally developed in probabilistic settings 
(perceptual systems in effect ask what out there most likely led to the signal accrued over 
this temporal window—and their answer may or may not preserve the temporal order of 
transduction), but the post-dictive point doesn’t require it. 
 
1. slot models vs. continuous resource models of visual working memory 
Beck is certainly right that there is as of yet no consensus concerning the correct 
conception of visual working memory. The recent paper he highlights by Pratte et al. 
(2017) is an excellent example of the continuing debate. They advert to the fact that there 
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is less variability among perceptual representations of cardinal orientations (0°, 90°, 
180°) than of oblique orientations, as well as a response bias towards the former. (One of 
us has done related work on color perception—see Bae et al., 2014; Bae et al. 2015.) The 
better performance of continuous resource models in previous studies, they argue, reflects 
an unwarranted advantage they have when such stimulus-specific variability is ignored; 
when the models incorporate it, slot models outperform continuous resource models, and 
hybrid models outperform them both. 
Exploring various models is currently a central research focus, and no doubt will 
yield many intriguing results. It’s worth noting, however, that, although “mixture 
models” like those found in Pratte et al. (2017) continue to be explored, other recent work 
points in a different direction. Whereas mixture models involve fitting parameters to a 
function and then making inferences about memory based on the parameter values 
obtained, the newer models involve simulating the activity of neural populations and then 
checking whether this activity could produce something like the experimentally-observed 
results. The newer models fit the data extremely well, and they are all (so far) either more 
obviously continuous-resource-like, or they have no resource limitations at all, with 
performance limits instead arising from the computations involved in encoding and 
retrieving data from the population code. Our paper mentioned Orhan and Ma’s (2015) 
‘unmixing’ model as one example of a model that does not involve any explicit resource 
limitation whatsoever. In their model, the more individual object signals are comingled in 
a population code, the less likely an accurate representation is retrieved—unmixed from 
the pool—for any of the objects. A more recent model without a resource constraint is 
found in Oberauer and Lin (2017), where memory limits arise entirely from interference 
among representations during retrieval. Schneegans and Bays (2017) explore a more 
continuous-resource-like model, wherein encoding and retrieval imprecision arise 
because of a continuous neural architecture that realizes feature-binding. 
However the various models fare, the lack of current consensus applies in all 
directions. Thus, to the conditionalized thesis Beck offers us—“if continuous resource 
models prove correct, then we have reason to doubt the existence of overflow” (perhaps 
better: if a model that does not assume a capacity limit proves correct, then some of the 
main reasons offered for overflow can be questioned)—we would add the thesis that the 
slot model behind some of the arguments for overflow at least cannot be taken for 
granted. (We don’t claim that Block simply takes it for granted—see Block 2008, pp. 
300-1, though he doesn’t happen to mention the way it is directly assumed in Lamme’s 
groups’ calculations.) Moreover, slot models currently in favor, because they incorporate 
probabilities, require capacity calculations distinct from those relied upon in the studies 
we discuss. 
Finally, we note some wording in this part of Beck’s discussion that we’d want to 
tweak—not to be picky, but to highlight a vehicle/content issue that’s worth further 
consideration. Beck writes of a ‘continuous resource of variable precision.’ But we’d 
prefer to speak of a continuous resource doled out in a way that yields representational 
content of variable precision. The question of overflow concerns the number of items 
represented—a matter of content. Slot models assume a capacity limit regarding the 
number of items represented; continuous resource models do not. (This is not their only 
difference: crucially, continuous resource models assume probabilistic representations; at 
least simple slot models do not, though hybrid slot models do.) Talk of slots, however, 
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also suggests a limit on the number of vehicles in the store. As is often the case, there is 
thus the risk of confusing vehicle and content; and in the literature one does find talk of 
both types. But movement from one to the other need not simply involve a mistaken 
slide. Rather, it often seems there is a substantive claim or assumption being made about 
the relation of vehicle and content—viz., that, at least in this case, a memory store is 
content-limited in part because of its being vehicle-limited. Indeed, claims or 
assumptions relating the vehicles and contents are common in discussions of continuous 
resource models too. Thus, Bays (2015, p. 431), for example, characterizes slot models as 
“posit[ing] three or four independent memory slots, each holding a detailed 
representation of one visual object” and continuous resource models as “propos[ing] that 
a limited supply of a representational medium [e.g., amount of spiking activity] is 
continuously distributed between visual objects [presumably, represented visual 
objects].” 
 
2. discretization and the loss of information 
Beck suggests that there is a sense in which our view allows overflow, albeit one 
sufficiently different from Block’s that it might be considered a reconception of it. The 
idea is that a probability distribution (or density—henceforth we leave this understood) 
contains more information than a sampling therefrom. We’re happy to allow that there is 
a sense in which this is so—for instance, the sampling by itself contains no information 
concerning variance in the distribution. But it must be emphasized how distant this is 
from the claim Block defends. 
First, whether this would support Block’s claim that perceptual consciousness 
overflows cognitive access depends on how perceptual consciousness relates to the 
probability distributions. We discussed the possibility that perceptual consciousness is 
associated with a sampling. If so, the overflow Beck suggests occurs prior to perceptual 
consciousness. (We also mentioned the possibility of associating perceptual 
consciousness with represented probability distributions, citing Morrison 2016. See now 
also Denison 2017 and Morrison 2017.) 
Second, it would depend as well on what counts as cognitive access. Sometimes 
entry into working memory is identified with, or considered sufficient for, cognitive 
access (Block 2007, p. 489). But the studies we cite concern probabilistic representations 
in visual working memory. So, one might see the representation of the probability 
distributions and the samplings as both occurring in cognition. (One might not, though, if 
one does not see VWM as part of the “global workspace” or otherwise a store entry into 
which suffices for cognitive access. For example, one might hypothesize perceptual 
working memories distinct from a central working memory. Incidentally, in our paper’s 
original draft we invoked the idea that presence in working memory sufficed for 
cognitive access, but changed that, at a referee’s suggestion, to the claim that it’s 
necessary (Gross and Flombaum 2017, p. 359). Note that it’s important that the claim 
concern working memory unrestricted, not more specifically visual working memory. Of 
course auditory representations needn’t pass through visual working memory (perhaps 
multi-modal representations aside). But even restricting ourselves to visual 
representations, Block himself, in his interpretation of Bronfman et al.’s results, seems 
committed to the cognitive access of gist representations that bypass visual working 
memory.) 
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Finally, we should note that even if a probability distribution contains more 
information than a sampling therefrom, it doesn’t follow that the information the sample 
loses is not accessed in some other way. Subjects’ metacognitive judgments concerning 
their perceptions are taken by some to reflect such information (Kepecs and Mainen 
2012). 
 
3. overflow of the number of items represented 
Beck also suggests that our view is compatible with there being more items 
represented in one set of probabilistic representations than another, so that the former can 
overflow the latter. The idea seems to be this: Assume that a sufficiently non-flat 
distribution represents things in accordance with the highest value it assigns (we ignore 
ties), and that a sufficiently flat distribution fails to represent anything. (Presumably there 
are also other senses in which they represent items or properties—for example, a 
distribution that assigns .5 to light from above and .5 to light from below presumably 
contains representations pertaining to light and location.) It is then possible that a 
transition from one set of probability distributions to another can amount to an overflow 
in this sense. For example, prior to the post-cue the visual system’s probabilistic 
representations might represent 10-11 items, while after the cue they might represent 3-4 
items, assuming the cue increases confidence in representations associated with the cued 
row while flattening the others. 
We grant that merely hypothesizing probabilistic representations does not 
preclude this. But we have several reservations. First, our paper challenged Block’s claim 
of evidence for overflow, not the very possibility of overflow. Second, and relatedly, 
what evidence is there that the visual system first represents in Beck’s sense 10-11 letters 
and then, post-cue, only represents 3-4? Above, we clarified that, given post-diction, it’s 
possible that no representations at all concerning specific letters are formed prior to the 
cue. (It could be, given the extensive training they receive, that subjects have a prior 
expectation of letters. And it may even be, as we mention, that the prior distribution may 
not be flat: perhaps not all letters are equi-probable. It’s a further matter whether it would 
be sufficiently non-flat by Beck’s lights.)  
Further, it is possible that, by Beck’s lights, the post-cue distribution does 
represent 10-11 letters. Sperling’s capacity estimates are based on the number of correct 
reports, where subjects were required to place some letter in every location. If the reports 
were based on sampling from distributions, then it’s possible that more than just 3-4 
distributions were sufficiently non-flat to represent letters in Beck’s sense, though only 
some resulted in veridical samplings. Presumably the probabilistic representations in the 
cued row are more non-flat than others and thus less open to sampling error, but there 
may be less non-flat representations (more subject to sampling error) in the other rows. 
Moreover, one might question the assumptions behind Beck’s suggestion. In the 
case of belief, how to relate credences and “full” (non-graded) beliefs is a disputed 
matter. Similarly, we may ask why probabilistic representations in perception should be 
assumed to represent in Beck’s sense—i.e., be assumed to represent things as being in 
accordance with the highest probability assigned in the distribution. Indeed, our sampling 
hypothesis can be understood as a proposal for how to understand the relation between at 
least these sorts of probabilistic representations and discrete ones: the latter result from 
sampling the former. One might adopt this perspective as an alternative to Beck’s 
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suggestion concerning what probabilistic representations represent in his special sense. 
Notice that they can diverge: one samples with a probability correlated with the 
probabilities assigned in the distribution, which allows for “error” (sometimes sampling a 
hypothesis not assigned the highest probability). 
Finally, we underscore again that Block’s overflow hypothesis is specifically 
about whether perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access, not just whether 
there is one store that overflows another. As Beck notes, further argumentation would be 
required to relate any overflow claim here to Block’s. In particular, if perceptual 
consciousness itself results from sampling, then the overflow from one probability 
distribution to another would not bear on Block’s claim. (But, again, see Morrison’s 
alternative.) 
 
 
Orlandi and Franklin 
Our paper suggests alternative interpretations for three experimental results that 
Block marshals in favor of his overflow claim—those due to Sperling, Lamme and 
colleagues, and Bronfman and colleagues. Orlandi and Franklin argue that, in each case, 
our alternatives face problems as well, sometimes problems parallel to those we raise for 
interpretations favoring overflow. We respond to each set of worries in turn. 
 
1. letters 
Orlandi and Franklin distinguish two ways we explain the Sperling results: one 
according to which the visual system fails to generate representations as of specific letters 
for some locations at all (henceforth, ‘no representations’), and another according to 
which the representations it generates have too low a probability to make it to report 
(henceforth, ‘low probability representations’). Orlandi and Franklin suggest it is unclear 
which explanation is ours. Our intention was to mark both as possibilities. In any event, 
Orlandi and Franklin argue that both have problems. 
About the first (‘no representations’), they present two worries: that the inferential 
aspect emphasized by our account becomes superfluous, and that it has difficulty 
accommodating subjects’ reported phenomenology. The first worry, they hold, arises 
because, really, our argument just turns on the fact that processing takes time and 
attention can enhance processing, which doesn’t require an inferential conception of 
visual processing. We wouldn’t put it quite that way. Perceptual processing does take 
time, but our emphasis—following Phillips (2011a) and others—was more specifically 
on the fact that perceptual processes operate over a temporally extended signal, so that 
there is a post-dictive window within which a later stimulus (such as a cue) can affect the 
representation of an earlier stimulus. Still, it is true that one may accept this without 
endorsing an inferential account of perception. What such an endorsement might amount 
to depends on what one means by ‘inferential.’ We distanced ourselves from the term 
(Gross and Flombaum 2017, p. 366, fn. 9), since some require that representations be 
conceptual for transitions among them to be candidates for inference. Be that as it may, 
our fundamental disagreement with both Block and his previous critics is that Sperling’s 
post-cues may affect, not just what is cognitively accessed, but what is represented in the 
first place—a point which might indeed be developed in various ways (as our paper’s 
four examples underscore). That said, it is important to us that the point can be developed 
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in ways that are plausible, for example because they are in line with currently fruitful 
empirical inquiry. We are interested in more than mere logical possibility. Orlandi and 
Franklin suggest that our point could be developed in a non-inferential, purely associative 
manner. The plausibility of this suggestion depends in part on what makes a process 
purely associative. We note that the “dependencies” or “contingencies” our paper 
emphasizes could perhaps be described as associations, and that often those who do cast 
perceptual processes in inferential terms—for example, as a kind of Bayesian inference—
allow that the algorithmic implementation might be associationist broadly construed (e.g., 
Griffiths et al. 2010). 
Orlandi and Franklin’s second worry for the ‘no representations’ view is that it 
has trouble explaining why subjects report seeing more than what they can remember. 
But we don’t think this is so. First, it should be noted that the reports typically cited are 
anecdotal; and often it is not clear how to interpret them. For example, a person may say 
she saw twelve letters when she saw twelve items generically as letters, but not 
necessarily all twelve specifically as this or that letter (Gross and Flombaum 2017, p. 362 
cites several replies to Block along these lines). In fact, in as yet unpublished work, Cova 
and colleagues found that fewer than half of their subjects presented with non-cued 
Sperling displays agreed that they saw all the letters; and, when probed further, most 
commonly selected descriptions like ‘I saw some of the letters, but not all’ or ‘I saw all 
the letters but only some in detail.’ Finally, Orlandi and Franklin suggest that the ‘no 
representations’ view predicts that subjects should report making a determination about 
they have seen based on remembered fragments. It’s not clear to us that ‘no 
representations’ predicts that: why wouldn’t subjects just say they aren’t sure beyond the 
4-5 they report, or that the other letters are ‘vague’ and ‘blurry’ (as Cova and colleagues 
report many of their subjects do say spontaneously in qualitative interviews)? 
Orlandi and Franklin raise two worries as well for the ‘low probability 
representations’ view. The first is similar to Beck’s suggestion that, really, we have 
reconceived overflow, instead of denying it. But perhaps a further remark here would be 
useful. Orlandi and Franklin say that, on this view, “the visual system represents a whole 
lot of letters, many more than the letters that are reported.” But Sperling required subjects 
to report a letter for each location. So, perhaps what Orlandi and Franklin should say is 
that there would be more letters visually represented than correctly reported. It’s in 
principle possible that probability distributions are generated for each letter, and that each 
is sampled, generating 12 discrete letter representations—12 cases of access. The flatter 
curves, however, would more likely lead to incorrect reports. (Cf. Gross and Flombaum 
2017, pp. 384-5.) 
The second worry for the ‘low probability representations’ view asks: “if it is 
troublesome to form discrete representations of letters, why is it any less troublesome to 
form probabilistic representations of letters?” The answer lies in the signal the visual 
system is dealt. Because the signal is noisy and ambiguous, the task of generating 
accurate representations as of specific letters may be too difficult, but it may well enable 
visual perception to generate a distribution of probabilities over the letters. Recall that the 
subjects are expecting letters, having received a high number of training trials (Gross and 
Flombaum 2017, p. 364). Arguably, the hypothesis space is already in place. It’s figuring 
out which is where that’s difficult. Compare: Someone is waving through the fog. It’s not 
hard to know it’s a human being. But it may be hard to know whether it’s a man or 
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woman. Yet some retrievable evidence might give you more reason to think it’s one 
rather than the other. It can be troublesome to form a (confident) “discrete” belief about 
gender, but less troublesome to form a probabilistic belief about it. 
 
2. orientation 
We point out that Lamme and colleagues’ interpretation of their results assumes a 
slot conception of memory that is challenged by more recent continuous resource models; 
and we offer several, not necessarily exclusive explanations of subjects’ change/no 
change reports in the various cueing conditions. Orlandi and Franklin raise a question 
about one of our suggestions: that “by redeploying attentional resources, the retro-cue can 
selectively protect corresponding representations of items in the first display from 
degradation and interference … [while] the post-cue [that comes with the second display] 
comes too late to have this effect” (Gross and Flombaum 2017, p. 377). They ask “why 
the post-cue would be too late, while the retro cue is not,” suggesting the cues are 
“roughly equivalent when we consider [visual working] memory as a single store.” But 
there are several reasons why they may not be equivalent. First, let us put to one side a 
reason ruled out by the experimental design. One might reason as follows: a memory 
representation, as our remark indicates, can deteriorate over time; also, the longer the 
interval, the greater the chance of it facing interference. The later the cue, therefore, the 
less likely it will succeed in successfully protecting the representation. This reasoning is 
right so far as it goes, and shows that adverting to the hypothesis of one memory store 
does not suffice to make Orlandi and Franklin’s point (so, if they are right, it is not for the 
reason they give). But the comparative timing in Lamme and colleagues’ retro-cue and 
post-cue conditions eliminates this explanation; for both cues occur 1000ms after the first 
display’s offset. For that reason, we should not have spoken simply in terms of the post-
cue coming too late. Nonetheless, a difference remains. The retro-cue occurs alone, while 
the post-cue occurs along with the second array. The presence of the second array itself 
may be a source of interference and cause deterioration of the memory representation. 
Indeed, Lamme and colleagues call their hypothesized intermediate memory store 
‘fragile visual short term memory’ precisely because it is said to be easily over-written. 
Further, and perhaps relatedly, the post-cue naturally directs attention to the relevant item 
in the second display. It may not be easy for one cue to direct attention as well to an item 
in memory. 
 
3. color 
Bronfman et al. (2014) – and Block (2014a) following them – argue that subjects’ 
ability to judge color diversity, while also performing at capacity on a Sperling-like 
letter-identification task, supports “overflow.” That color-diversity judgments come “for 
free”—that is, without causing letter identification to drop below capacity—is supposed 
to suggest, along with other results, that perceptual consciousness represents color-related 
features beyond visual working memory capacity—representations whose content 
presumably becomes available for report through some other pathway that by-passes 
visual working memory and its limited capacity. 
Orlandi and Franklin suggest that these results pose a problem for the alternative 
conception of perceptual processing and visual working memory that we present, for it is 
unclear why, on our view, subjects should get color representations “for free.” Of course, 
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we question whether subjects have perceptual experience as of specific colors for all or 
most of the letters. But we allow that they may have perceptual experience as of some 
sort of color-related feature—perhaps experience as of color (the genus) and experience 
as of high/low color diversity. Is it a problem for us that subjects seemingly get this “for 
free”? The problem can’t be that subjects have a limited visual working memory capacity 
and yet are able to report color-diversity above chance, for our alternative does not posit a 
capacity limit on visual working memory. It seems the problem is rather supposed to be 
that the processing requires time or attentional resources in a way that our alternative 
can’t readily handle. But it’s not clear to us why. Gist perceptions, for example, are 
notoriously fast (Oliva 2005). And while it’s been argued that they require attentional 
resources (Mack and Clarke 2012), it’s not clear that the attentional resources available in 
this task are not sufficient. Though subjects are told that the letter-identification task is 
primary, they are also instructed that they will be asked about color-diversity and receive 
training to this end. Moreover, the attention required for a gist-based judgment of color-
diversity is for features at a different scale than that required by the letter-identification 
task. It would need to be shown that the attentional resources compete, or do so 
sufficiently, to predict a difference in performance on color-diversity judgments in cued 
versus uncued rows (as per Orlandi and Franklin’s final point)—especially as subjects 
were trained to associate those cues with the letter-identification task. 
 
 
Phillips 
Phillips asks four main questions: first, how do we regard our talk of 
representations and its relation to informational persistence; second, do we see recent 
work as superseding non-unitary models of iconic memory; third, using a point made by 
Matsukura and Hollingsworth (2011), might one might challenge Lamme and colleagues 
proposed intermediate store (fragile visual short term memory) while remaining neutral 
between slot and continuous resource models; and, fourth, to what bridging principles are 
we committed regarding information processing and phenomenal consciousness? 
 
1. representations and informational persistence 
Block holds that perceptual consciousness “overflows” cognitive access. This 
goes beyond the claim that subjects have perceptual experience that is not accessed. For 
perceptual consciousness and cognitive access could diverge without the former 
“overflowing” the latter (Gross and Flombaum 2017, p. 385). We followed Block in 
understanding the “overflow” claim in terms of comparative capacity. We followed him 
as well in understanding comparative capacity in terms of the number of items 
represented in distinct—presumably functionally individuated—representational stores 
(though Block doesn’t happen to use ‘store’ as a nominal). We did so both because we 
are sympathetic to at least some of the assumptions behind these construals—for 
example, that perceptual experience is representational—and because it enabled us to 
frame our disagreement in terms that even Block would accept. (One wrinkle we should 
have added: One might distinguish the following two notions of overflow. First, the 
capacity of one store can be greater than that of another. Second, the number of items in 
fact represented in a store on some occasion can be greater than that of another. That a 
store has some capacity does not entail that it must always be used up. So, in the second 
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sense a store can overflow another of the same capacity, albeit for some reason other than 
that emphasized by Block.) 
Phillips suggests that one might instead state the core disagreement in terms of 
information, which would add precision and not require waiting upon a worked-out 
theory of representation. But, he argues, if the debate is so formulated, the question arises 
whether we can avoid commitment to a rich store after all, in addition to a later visual 
memory store. 
The term ‘information’ is itself used in many ways, so more detail would be 
needed to assess whether it provides a gain in precision. (Of course, it’s not expected that 
Phillips develop the idea in a brief commentary.) Phillips refers to “some trace of the 
stimulus which persists after offset for the cue to allow its selective encoding.” This is 
indeed a less demanding notion than we had in mind, encompassing, as it does, even the 
transduced signal. (It is perhaps sufficiently weak as to follow constitutively from what 
perception is, at least in the veridical case, that such information is contained even in the 
transduced signal.) We can allow that there are senses, including this, in which there may 
be more information at an earlier stage of processing than a later stage. Of course, as 
Phillips no doubt would agree, this by itself won’t help Block, since he would not 
associate perceptual consciousness with the signal or any other non-representational state. 
Does recasting the debate in informational terms sharpen it or just reveal further fault 
lines? The debate concerns whether one perceptually experiences more than one 
cognitively accesses. If there is good reason to maintain that perceptual experience is 
representational, then the debate ought not to be recast in other terms. Our apparent 
disagreement with some other challenges to the overflow claim—such as Phillips’—
might then turn on substantive disagreements about perceptual experience rather than “a 
certain looseness in talk of representations.” 
Two further comments. First, contrary to Phillips’ suggestion, we did not commit 
ourselves to there being only one visual store. We discussed both that possibility and the 
possibility that there are successive visual stores of the same capacity. That said, his 
argument that we might be committed to there being at least two visual stores, if correct, 
would of course preclude the possibility of there being only one. Second, we explored 
both the possibility that vision might fail to form representations of some letters and the 
possibility that it may form probabilistic representations of all of them. It is not clear 
(absent details concerning the relevant notion of information) why the second possibility 
would not to be consistent with the later visual store containing in some sense the same 
amount of information concerning specific letters as the earlier store. 
 
2. supersession of non-unitary models of sensory memory? 
Phillips also asks if the single-store view we consider supersedes earlier models 
that challenge the idea of a unitary sensory memory. The short “answer” is that we need 
to think more about how to relate these results and debates to our suggestion. Part of the 
complexity of this question stems from Phillips’ point that it’s not obvious what 
constitutes a store—in particular, what functional properties might individuate them and 
what sort of nesting and dynamic changes they might allow. In places, we invoked 
hierarchical perceptual processing, allowing that this may involve not just hierarchical 
dependencies among representations, but also a temporal hierarchy in their generation. 
One could argue that this temporal progression itself suggests a series of stores. At 
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another point (Gross and Flombaum 2017, p. 383), we allow time-sequenced 
representations within a single store, albeit there we had in mind that this was in virtue of 
represented temporal content. (The distinction between temporal properties of 
representations and temporal representational content receives some discussion in Gross 
(forthcoming).) The question of what constitutes a store and how they are individuated—
and whether this is a useful construct in the first place—bears also on Phillips’ last 
question concerning how information-processing models are related to phenomenal 
consciousness. As Phillips’ notes, Irvine (2011) argues that a multiplicity of sensory 
stores—as opposed to a unified iconic memory—significantly complicates and perhaps 
undermines such questions. Unclarity as to what a store even is complicates them further. 
But Phillips presents another question for us to deal with first. 
 
3. alternative challenge to Lamme and colleagues 
We argued that Lamme and colleague’s capacity calculation assumed a slot model 
of visual working memory that can be challenged. Phillips asks what we think of another 
challenge, one that applies even if one upholds a slot model. Actually, he asks what 
“precisely [we] think one needs to commit to in order to resist the postulation of fragile 
VSTM.” Rather than address that formulation head on, perhaps we may say that there 
may be various interesting challenges to fragile VSTM or to arguments for it, and it’s 
worthwhile to identify them all and their varying commitments. Because they may be 
committed in different ways, they may be open to different counter-replies. (“Your 
honor, my client doesn’t even own a dog. And, anyway, his dog doesn’t have any teeth.”) 
The challenge comes from Matsukura and Hollingworth (2011). They suggest that 
calculating Cowan’s K on a post-cue change-detection task may over-estimate capacity, 
because subjects will be incented to forget uncued items, whereas Cowan’s capacity 
formula assumes that subjects attempt to encode and retain all items. Now, Lamme and 
colleagues’ subjects may well have attempted to encode all items into memory, since they 
didn’t know where a post-cue might point. (It’s possible that some subjects, finding the 
task difficult, adopted a strategy of just picking a region and hoping for the best, like a 
goalie on a penalty kick who just chooses a side in advance. That would be a different 
challenge, which we’ll bracket.) Does the post-cue’s incentive to forget non-cued items 
then cause problems for Cowan’s calculation and its retention assumption, assuming a 
slot model? It’s unclear it does—at least with simple slot models. Presumably, by the 
time of the cue, items have either made it into memory or not. The cue cannot cause 
anything to be added to memory. Does forgetting non-cued items affect performance, on 
a simple slot model? Let’s assume that the subject makes no correspondence errors, of 
the sort we suggested could alternatively account for at least some of Lamme and 
colleagues’ results. Let’s likewise assume that the memory representations are all-or-
nothing and don’t interfere with one another. How does dropping other items from 
memory improve performance in reporting whether the cued item has changed? The 
model provides no reason it should. (Orlandi and Franklin’s question would also have to 
be addressed, though perhaps we have already suggested how: Why wouldn’t an even 
later cue, one that comes along with the second array, likewise incent one to forget non-
cued items, with similar results?) 
There may be good answers to these questions. Certainly there are more 
sophisticated capacity-limited models that allow for variable precision. But they would 
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need to be considered in detail, while assessing whether the mechanisms hypothesized fit 
the data as well as the continuous resource alternative. Our paper’s second proposed way 
of accounting for Lamme and colleagues’ results bears a family resemblance to 
Matsukura and Hollingworth’s suggestion, but is developed in a probabilistic manner 
(Gross and Flombaum 2017, pp. 376-7). 
 
4. bridging information processing and phenomenal consciousness 
Our paper engaged in some speculative rumination concerning how perceptual 
consciousness might relate to representational stores hypothesized by a probabilistic 
account of visual working memory. Phillips asks us to consider the possibility there is no 
mapping—well, no simple mapping—between stores and phenomenology of any kind 
and that it’s a “fundamental mistake” to think computational models could overturn 
phenomenologically-based claims concerning perceptual consciousness. He asks in 
particular what “bridge commitments [we] think constrain the relationship between a 
story told at the information processing level without mentioning phenomenal 
consciousness and claims about phenomenal consciousness.” 
We are certainly open to the possibility that the relations are complex, perhaps 
ultimately even inscrutable to beings like us; Phillips is right to broaden the space of 
options. But, for that reason, we do not think in terms of bridge commitments. We think 
that it is important to explore bridge hypotheses and that this is the most likely way we 
will make whatever progress we are capable of making on these difficult topics, even if in 
the end the progress (as it were) is negative. As Phillips points out, from the perspective 
of the alternative viewpoint he floats, it is “obscure how to connect disputes regarding the 
modeling of short-term visual memory and disputes concerning the contents of visual 
consciousness.” (We are put in mind of Lee’s (2014, p. 5) reaction to what could seem an 
attempt by Phillips (2011b, 2014) to detach temporal experience from its apparent 
neurophysiological and computational underpinnings—or at least to complexify their 
relations: “I find this view hard to understand.”) In inquiry, we try to find a foothold 
where we can, and sometimes (shifting metaphors) light is shed, sometimes not. While 
we don’t rule out Phillips’ possibility, we also don’t rule out the possibility of 
phenomenological claims on these matters being overturned by plausible empirical 
evidence that meshes with plausible larger theories. 
 
 
Our commentators have given us much to think about, and, as promised, some of 
it we will need to think about much more. Thanks again! 
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